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nce again the theme of this Merrill Conference is timely; multiple public policy 
issues are having an impact on the enterprise of scientific research. Some of 
these issues impose systemic limitations on the ‘how’ of our research activities. 
For example, several years ago at this conference, we discussed constraints imposed by 
the Student and Exchange Visitor Information System (SEVIS) regulations and the 
impact on research and training of foreign national graduate students. These 
restrictions continue, and international student applications to U.S. graduate schools 
are at an all-time low. Others of these issues seek to limit the ‘what’ of our research 
efforts. An example raised by many speakers at this conference has been the use of 
human embryonic stems cells in biomedical research. 
 
This text takes a slightly different 
approach by examining historical 
examples where public policy decisions 
collided with the science research 
enterprise. I am not a historian; this is a 
biologist’s look at history. Yet it is 
important to realize that national 
administrative decisions can profoundly 
focus our enterprise, even as we seek to 
provide our policy makers with decision-
quality information. Therefore, through 
the perspective of history we will focus 
on two obvious questions—which lead to 
a research compliance concern. 
Question 1: Can policy decisions shape the 
future of science? 
The answer to this question is, quite 
obviously, yes. Government largely 
provides the funding for scientific 
research, and despite the concept of peer 
review Washington feels free to set 
research agendas. For example, why does 
the Navy fund a major cancer research 
program?  
Choice of the historical example 
highlighted in this talk was motivated by 
two crown jewel resources available here 
in the Midwest: the Eisenhower Library 
and Museum in Abilene, Kansas, and the 
Kansas Cosmosphere and Space Center 
(KCSC) in Hutchinson. K-State was 
fortunate to host a number of 
undergraduate research scholars during 
the past summer, and the K-State 
Graduate School invited them on a trip to 
the KCSC. KCSC tells a remarkable story 
of the U.S. commitment to the space 
program. Much of this commitment grew 
during the Eisenhower presidency—as is 
reinforced by exhibits at the Eisenhower 
Library and Museum—and it certainly 
led the way to the robust science 
programs we see today. 
O 
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The Eisenhower presidency made a 
major decision that set the stage for initial 
losses in the space ‘race,’ which I believe 
set the stage for the larger victory. The 
decision had its roots in events during 
World War II. In February 1945, Stalin, 
Churchill, and Roosevelt met to divide 
Germany. Stalin was ecstatic, since the 
Russian zone would contain the major 
weapons and missile development 
region: Peenemünde. 
 
Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin at the 
conference in Yalta at which the fate of 
Germany was decided. (NASA file photo.) 
In June of 1945, however, Dr. Warner 
von Braun surrendered to U.S. troops, 
and Secretary of State Cordell Hull 
approved moving von Braun, 126 
members of his staff, and 300 train cars of 
V2 rockets and missile parts to the U.S.. 
Stalin was furious and launched an 
aggressive missile development program 
immediately following the war. 
When Eisenhower assumed the 
presidency, there were two groups—the 
Army (von Braun et al.) and the Navy—
who were active in missile development. 
Eisenhower added a third—a civilian 
effort that later became NASA. Further, 
he mandated that any progress in orbital 
spaceflight be made in a civilian effort. 
Though in ancient times Seneca (4 
B.C.-39 A.D.) wrote, “There is no easy way 
between the Earth and the stars,” von 
Braun made tremendous progress from 
1948 to 1954 with the Redstone rocket. 
Yet in 1955 he was told in no uncertain 
terms to stop all efforts in satellite launch. 
Eisenhower announced an orbital flight 
program in 1956, with the disaster-prone 
Vanguard program in the lead. On May 
22, 1956, the Secretary of Defense 
announced that “there are no plans or 
preparations using Redstone or the new 
Jupiter missiles as launch vehicles.” Von 
Braun’s team was shut out, despite 
overwhelming superiority, because it was 
a military, not civilian, operation. 
On September 20, 1956, a Jupiter C 
rocket achieved escape velocity, but did 
not have permission to orbit. In August 
1957, a Jupiter C nosecone was 
retrieved—the first ever recovery 
following spaceflight (again, no orbital 
permission). Jules Verne said that 
“Anything that one man can imagine, 
other men can make real.” The Soviets 
proved the saying by launching Sputnik I 
(October 4, 1957) and Sputnik II 
(November 3, 1957), and the U.S. lost the 
space war: part 1. 
In a complete reversal, on November 
7, 1957, Eisenhower announced that the 
Jupiter (von Braun’s) program had solved 
all of the U.S. problems and that orbital 
flight was near. In January of the 
following year, Explorer I was launched; 
it put into orbit a radiation sensing 
payload developed by a University of 
Iowa colleague, Professor James van 
Allen. 
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Dr. Warner von Braun (far right), Jet Propulsion Laboratory Director James Pickering, 
and State University of Iowa Professor James van Allen showing a model of Explorer I 
following the first successful U.S. orbital missile launch. (NASA file photo.) 
 
The U.S. lost phase one of the space 
race because of Eisenhower’s pro-civilian 
policies. Kennedy, however, needed to 
reclaim international leadership. He 
asked his staff to recommend strategies, 
and Lyndon Johnson provided the 
answer–put a man on the moon. The 
Apollo program had begun. 
Tribute to the last footprint left on the 
moon in 1972 at the Kansas Cosmosphere 
& Space Center. (Personal photo by the author.) 
The last human footprint on the moon 
occurred on December 13, 1972, left by 
Apollo 17 commander Cernan. 
(Coincidently, University of Kansas 
graduate Ronald Evans was on the 
mission.) Would we have gone to the 
moon if Eisenhower had won the race to 
orbital spaceflight? I think not. 
Question 2: Can (bad) science shape the 
future of public policy? 
For a historical example of science 
shaping public policy, I turned to our 
Vice Provost for Research, Dr. R.W. 
Trewyn for a suggestion. His suggested 
example illuminates activities during the 
Viet Nam War, when the U.S. extensively 
used defoliants like Agent Orange to 
deny terrain to the enemy. 
Dr. Trewyn was asked to be a 
consultant on a study of the health effects 
on soldiers involved in herbicide 
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application. The accompanying photo 
shows that little personal protective 
equipment was used, and that adverse 
conditions such as prop-wash from 
helicopters did not deter spraying. As  
The spraying of herbicide—likely Agent 
Orange—in Viet Nam without the use of 
personal protective equipment. (U.S. Army 
file photo) 
 
part of his efforts, Dr. Trewyn was asked 
to testify to the National Affairs, Veterans 
Affairs, and International Affairs 
Subcommittee of the House Committee 
on Governmental Reform. The focus was 
on the Air Force Ranch Hands Study on 
the Health Effects of Agent Orange 
(March 2000). And his message was this: 
the study was flawed, because the control 
group was inappropriate. 
The U.S. government had based its 
treatment of veteran soldiers on a flawed 
study. Even though the flaws were 
unearthed, the science team refused to 
change the parameters during the two 
decades of the study. Bad science helped 
to create bad policy. 
 
 
Are there implications for the research 
administrator? 
As mentioned earlier, my last presen-
tation to this audience concerned SEVIS 
and its impact on our international 
graduate student clients. My example 
addressing this question involves 
foreign-born students as well, but the 
impact is on our faculty scientist, not on 
the student. 
Export control regulations are not 
new. Rather, they are decades old and 
they have their roots in political 
differences amongst nations. Export from 
the U.S. is liberal to Canada and Mexico, 
but almost nothing can be exported to 
Cuba or North Korea. The political 
climate for the university researcher 
changed dramatically, however, in 1994, 
when information—the results of 
university scientific research—became an 
export commodity. 
Export Administration Regulations 
(EAR) are administered by the U.S. 
Department of Commerce and regulate 
items that could be mutually used for 
business or for defense (such as global 
positioning systems). International Traffic 
in Arms Regulations (ITAR) are 
administered by the U.S. Department of 
State to regulate weapons and related 
items. EAR violations can result in faculty 
members being fined up to $1 million and 
10 years imprisonment, while ITAR 
violations can result in $100,000 fines and 
two years imprisonment. The faculty 
member, not the university, is personally 
liable. 
Since 1994, the concept of ‘deemed 
export’ has come into play. Simply put, in 
order to convey restricted information or 
protected software code to a foreign 
coworker (undergraduate student, 
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graduate student, postdoctoral, or faculty 
colleague), one must first obtain an export 
license. The restrictions come into play 
when faculty members accept research 
contracts/agreements which (a) contain 
limitations on publishing the findings of 
research, (b) are based on the sponsor 
providing sensitive or confidential 
information which will not be published, 
or (c) are classified by the government. 
EAR, ITAR, and the concepts of 
deemed exports mean that universities 
must add a layer onto their research 
compliance activities. At Kansas State 
University, we have begun that process. 
 
